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Abstract
In an economy with financial frictions, banks endogenously choose excessive leverage
and maturity mismatch in equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the risk of socially
wasteful fire sales. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple lin-
ear constraints, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. The Liquidity
Coverage and Net Stable Funding ratios of Basel III can implement efficiency. Addi-
tional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially
costly. Micro- and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes. Optimally, macro-
prudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle, while
microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial policy is traditionally motivated by the ’microprudential’ concern that bank failures
are socially costly. Following the crisis of 2008, ’macroprudential’ concerns have surfaced
(Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 2011). Banks’ individual choices can contribute to systemic
risk, which causes inefficient fire sales and market freezes, thus harming the financial sector
as a whole.
Systemic risk is not caused exclusively by insufficient bank capital. It is amplified if banks
fund long-term investments with short-term debt and become illiquid in a crisis (Brun-
nermeier 2009). In response to this problem, the Basel III Accord (BIS 2010) introduces
Liquidity Coverage and Net Stable Funding requirements, supplementing traditional capital
requirements. These policies reflect macroprudential concerns and explicitly target bank
liquidity.
This paper addresses two questions from a welfare-theoretic perspective:
1. How should capital and liquidity be regulated to deal with systemic risk?
2. How should this interact with microprudential regulation against costly bank failures?
I analyze an economy with three financial frictions. First, banks need equity downpayments,
or ’skin in the game’, to raise funding. Second, banks can only sell assets to outside buyers
at fire sale prices. Fire sales are socially wasteful because outside buyers cannot extract as
much surplus from assets as banks. Third, banks’ creditors have a preference for liquidity,
so that long-term debt commands an interest premium.
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The first two frictions are now standard in the literature on financial frictions, which I review
in the next section. The liquidity premium is new, and allows me to study the interplay
between endogenous maturity structure and fire sales.
Banks make long-term investments which are subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
They fund themselves with equity and debt, choosing the maturity of debt endogenously.
Banks trade off the liquidity premium on long-term debt against rollover risk to choose their
maturity structure.
Fire sales occur when a bad aggregate shock creates a liquidity shortfall in the banking
sector. Then, banks struggle to roll over short-term debt due to the ’skin in the game’
constraint, and have to sell assets to outside buyers in order to repay short-term creditors.
Fire sales happen when banks are highly leveraged, or when their balance sheets feature
strong maturity mismatch.
Macroprudential regulation is justified by a systemic risk externality – technically a pecuniary
externality. Banks have weaker incentives to reduce leverage and maturity mismatch than a
social planner. While a planner takes into account the effect of reduced leverage or maturity
mismatch on prices and the likelihood of costly fire sales, competitive banks take prices as
given. Therefore, the marginal private benefit of reduced leverage or mismatch is less than
the social benefit. Due to the incompleteness of markets, the pecuniary externality renders
the competitive equilibrium inefficient as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985).
To answer my first question, I consider three modes of intervention: Centralization by a
social planner, regulation using balance sheet constraints as in Basel III, and Pigouvian
taxation. The planner’s choices are efficient and maximize welfare subject to a ’no fire sale
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condition’.
Constraint-based regulation can achieve efficiency by imposing the ’no fire sale’ condition on
banks. It only depends on systematic cash flow risk and the ’skin in the game’ constraint,
and does not require knowledge of other parameters such as funding costs, average returns
to investment or idiosyncratic risk. The efficient Pigouvian tax, on the other hand, generally
depends on all parameters. Thus, constraint-based regulation requires less information. This
result is fairly robust to extensions of the baseline model.
For the second question, I consider an extended model where bank failures generate dead-
weight social costs. Systemic risk and default risk are not equivalent, and an additional
microprudential constraint may be required to limit bank failures. I show that micro- and
macroprudential regulation are imperfect substitutes from two perspectives. On the one
hand, one regulation may be sufficient for efficiency, but this is not true for all parameter
values. On the other hand, removing macroprudential regulation may increase the optimal
toughness of microprudential regulation, and vice versa. Moreover, the informational require-
ments of macro- and microprudential regulation are similar, which suggests that delegating
them to separate institutions may be suboptimal.
The optimal policy can be implemented within the Basel III framework. I show that the
optimal macroprudential policy can be implemented using either the Liquidity Coverage
Ratio (LCR) or Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirements of Basel III. This result
supports the ratios-based approach of Basel III. While the LCR and NSFR are equivalent
in my three-period model, richer dynamics can justify the use of a short-term LCR and
long-term NSFR, as is seen in practice.
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My theory supports time-varying macroprudential regulation, because optimal rules should
react to changes in systematic risk and credit conditions. However, microprudential rules
should also be time-varying, and additionally keep track of cross-sectional idiosyncratic risk.
The next section puts the paper in the context of the related literature. Section 3 sets up
the model. Section 4 analyzes the competitive equilibrium and welfare. Sections 5 and 6
consider optimal macro- and microprudential regulation. Section 7 discusses the reaction of
optimal regulation over the business cycle. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix
A, and Appendix B explains some technical conditions.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
There is a rich recent literature on pecuniary externalities and fire sales. Shleifer and Vishny
(2011) provide an excellent theoretical and empirical survey on fire sales. Lorenzoni (2008)
demonstrates that fire sales generate excessive short-term borrowing, and Shleifer and Vishny
(2010) further explore their destabilizing effects. Perotti and Suarez (2011) look at optimal
ways of regulating maturity in a reduced-form model without a separate leverage choice.
Korinek (2012) studies a three-period model of excessive leverage, whereas Bianchi and Men-
doza (2012) and Jeanne and Korinek (2010) compute optimal leverage policies in calibrated
infinite-horizon models. Stein (2012) considers regulating the choice between short-term and
long-term debt through ’cap-and-trade’ mechanisms. Gersbach and Rochet (2012) demon-
strate a systemic externality in a model based on productivity shocks and moral hazard.
Finally, Goodhart et al. (2013) study the impact of multiple regulations by simulating a
complex general equilibrium model.1
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In this context, this paper contributes by proposing optimal constraint-based regulation tar-
geting both leverage and maturity mismatch, and by offering an explicit comparison with
Pigouvian taxes. Moreover, I characterize the interplay of optimal macro- and micropruden-
tial regulation analytically in a model with several externalities.
In recent work, Farhi and Werning (2013) suggest ’aggregate demand externalities’, driven
by nominal rigidities, as a motivation for macroprudential policy. Korinek and Simsek (2014)
show that such externalities can generate excessive leverage, because agents do not internalize
the risk of Keynesian liquidity traps. My model does not have nominal rigidities, but the
interactions capital and liquidity regulation would be similar in a setting with aggregate
demand externalities.
The corporate finance literature emphasizes maturity choices based on asymmetric informa-
tion. Flannery (1986) shows that firms can use short-term borrowing as a signal of quality.
In Diamond (1991), firms choose debt maturity by trading off the risk of inefficient liqui-
dation by short-term creditors against the possibility of improved credit-ratings and cheap
refinancing. This paper proposes an alternative story specific to banks, where the trade-off
is driven by possible fire sales and the liquidity preference of creditors. A similar mechanism
is explored by Chen, Xu and Yang (2013), who model maturity choice as determined by
rollover risk due to debt overhang and investors’ exposure to liquidity needs.
Fire sales also arise in the macroeconomic literature on the ’financial accelerator’ (Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999, Shin 2010 ,He and Krishnamurthy
2012). Additional sources of financial instability include ’margin spirals’, when ’skin in the
game’ requirements rise in bad times (Geanakoplos 2009, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009),
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uncertainty about complex financial networks (Caballero and Simsek 2009) and irrational
expectations (Gennaioli et al. 2012).
Bank runs are another cause of financial fragility. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) sparked a vast
literature on this subject based on multiple equilibria. More recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2013) analyse bank runs in a dynamic economy with endogenous liquidity mismatch. Bank
runs do not occur in my model because bank debt is secured and there is no sequential
service. If unsecured debt were introduced, runs on unsecured debt and ’skin in the game’
constraints on secured debt would work together to exacerbate bank funding problems and
fire sales.
3 THE MODEL
Agents and time. There are three types of agents: Banks, creditors and outside buyers.
All agents are risk-neutral and nobody discounts the future. There is a unit measure of each
type. The model has three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and one consumption good called cash, which
can be stored costlessly over time by all agents.
Aggregate uncertainty. The aggregate state is good or bad: s ∈ {g, b}. The bad state
occurs with probability P [s = b] = α, and the good state occurs with probability 1−α. The
aggregate state becomes public information at t = 1.
Individual uncertainty among banks. For bank i ∈ [0, 1], the individual state is high or
low: zi ∈ {H,L}. The low individual state occurs with probability P [zi = L] = β, and the
high state occurs with probability 1−β. The individual state is independent of the aggregate
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state, and independent across banks. Individual states also become public information at
t = 1.
Bank projects. Banks can invest in risky long-term projects at t = 0, which cost one
unit of cash. At t = 1, each project yields a state-contingent cash flow v1s + εzi . v1s is the
aggregate cash flow, and v1g > v1b ≥ 0. εzi is the idiosyncratic shock, and εH > εL. Without
loss of generality, assume that E [εzi ] = (1− β) εH + βεL = 0.2
At t = 2, each project yields v2s, where v2b < v2g ≤ 1.3 The t = 2 cash flow is a partial
repayment of the initial investment, and the fraction repaid is higher in the good state. Let
R = E [v1s + v2s] − 1, and assume that R > 0, so that projects have positive expected net
present value.
After cash flows are received at t = 1, projects are traded in a competitive secondary market.
The secondary market price for projects at t = 1 in aggregate state s is ps.
Collateral constraint. Banks can raise debt from creditors, using projects as collateral. As
in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), there is an exogenous ’marked-to-market’ collateral constraint:
loan = (1− h)×market value of collateral (1)
where h ∈ (0, 1) is the ’haircut’ on debt. Other things being equal, a larger haircut decreases
the likelihood of default, since more collateral is pledged per unit borrowed. h is assumed to
be large enough to rule out any bank default in the baseline model - an explicit condition is
given below.4
I take the ’market value’ of project collateral at time 0 to be the initial investment of 1.
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This can be motivated explicitly by introducing a competitive sector of entrepreneurs, who
can convert cash into projects one-for-one and sell them to banks at t = 0. The zero-profit
condition of an entrepreneur then states that the t = 0 market value of projects will be 1.5
Creditors and liquidity preference. Banks make ’take it or leave it’ offers of short- and
long-term debt contracts to creditors. Short-term debt contracts last one period and can be
issued at t = 0 and t = 1. Long-term debt lasts two periods and is only available at t = 0.
Each creditor has an endowment of Y at t = 0 and I assume that Y is large, so that the
bank never exhausts creditors’ endowment at any date.
Creditors have a preference for liquidity due to a potential investment opportunity at t = 1,
which yields a net return of q > 0 at t = 2. Alternatively, one can think of creditors having
a potential liquidity need at t = 1, and a marginal utility of 1 + q of servicing this need.
Creditors are heterogeneous, and uniformly distributed on the unit interval. For creditor
k ∈ [0, 1], the investment opportunity arises with probability λ (k), where λ (0) = 0 and
λ′ (k) > 0, independently across creditors.
Banks optimally offer interest payments to make creditors indifferent between debt contracts
and holding cash. No interest payment is required on short-term debt, as long as Y is large
enough so that banks can borrow freely from creditors without an investment opportunity at
t = 1. The required long-term interest rate for creditor k is λ (k) q > 0, which compensates
for the expected cost of forgone opportunities.
Note that long-term debt is not only costly for banks, but also reduces the social surplus.
Long-term debt reduces socially valuable maturity transformation by intermediaries. I as-
sume implicitly that creditors cannot trade long-term debt after liquidity shocks are revealed
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at t = 1. If this were relaxed, maturity transformation would be carried out in the market
for long-term debt, and long-term debt would no longer be socially costly.
Bank investments at t = 0. Each bank has a fixed equity endowment of e0.6 Since banks
are ex ante identical, I suppress i-superscripts and analyse the decisions of the representative
bank (’the bank’), contingent on aggregate and individual states.
The bank invests in n0 projects funded by (and pledged as collateral against) short-term
debt. By the collateral constraint (1), it raises (1− h)n0 in short-term debt, and contributes
hn0 of its own equity.
The bank invests in n¯0 projects funded by long-term debt. It raises (1− h) n¯0 in long-term
debt and contributes hn¯0 of its own equity. The bank is obliged to hold the collateral, n¯0
projects, until the debt matures.
The cheapest way to borrow (1− h) n¯0 units long-term is to go to the creditors who are least
likely to have an investment opportunity. Thus, the bank borrows Y units from all creditors
k ∈ [0, (1− h) n¯0/Y ], promising each of them an interest payment of λ (k) qY . This implies




λ (k) qY dk ≡ r (n¯0) (2)
It is easy to verify that the function r is strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice differ-
entiable, with r (0) = r′ (0) = 0.
Any equity not spent on downpayments is held as cash, denoted c0.7 The bank’s choices at
t = 0 are summarized by x0 = (c0, n0, n¯0) ∈ R3+, and its budget is
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e0 = h (n0 + n¯0) + c0 (3)
Let B0 ⊂ R3+ be the set of bank choices x0 that satisfy the budget.
Diseconomies of scale. Investing in risky projects requires careful monitoring and risk
management, which becomes increasingly costly as the scale of investment increases. This
implies that there are diseconomies of scale to investment in risky projects. The bank incurs
a disutility of monitoring effort at t = 0 which is equal to g (n0 + n¯0), where the function g
is strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice differentiable.8
Bank cash flows at t = 1. After states s and z are revealed at t = 1, the bank receives the
cash flow v1s + εz for the n0 + n¯0 projects it invested in at t = 0. It also repays its short-term
creditors (1− h)n0.
The bank’s equity at t = 1, denoted ez1s, is defined as the sum of the net cash flow and the
value of its marketable assets. Marketable assets exclude the n¯0 projects which are pledged
as collateral against long-term debt. The remaining assets are cash c0 and n0 projects with
a market value of ps each. Hence, equity is
ez1s = c0 + (n0 + n¯0) (v1s + εz) + n0ps − (1− h)n0 (4)
Bank investments at t = 1. After trading in the secondary market, the bank holds
nz1s projects funded by new short-term debt. By the collateral constraint (1), it raises
(1− h) psnz1s in debt and contributes hpsnz1s of its own equity. The bank holds cz1s units
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of cash. Its choices at t = 1 are xz1s = (cz1s, nz1s) ∈ R2+, and its budget is
ez1s = hpsnz1s + cz1s (5)
where ez1s is its t = 1 equity, which is related to its first-period choices x0 by equation (4).
Let Bz1s (x0) ⊂ R2+ be the set of bank choices that satisfy the budget.
Bank cash flows at t = 2 in state s. The bank receives the cash flow v2s for the n¯0 + nz1s
projects held at t = 1. It repays short-term and long-term creditors. The bank’s utility Πzs
is given by the sum of the net cash flow and retained cash, minus monitoring costs incurred
previously:
Πzs = cz1s + v2s (nz1s + n¯0)− (1− h) psnz1s − (1− h) n¯0 − r (n¯0)− g (n0 + n¯0) (6)
Outside buyers. In addition to banks, outside buyers participate in the secondary market
for projects at t = 1. Outside buyers have less project management skills than banks, and
can only extract a cash flow of p < v2b per project at t = 2.
Competitive equilibrium. Market clearing requires that the banking sector cannot be a
net buyer of projects in the secondary market, since no projects are sold by anybody else.
Moreover, if a strictly positive number of projects are sold by the banking sector, then their
price must equal the marginal valuation of outside buyers p. This value plays the role of a
fire sale price.
Note that in aggregate state s, a measure β of banks have a low individual shock zi = L ,
and sell n0 − nL1s projects. A measure 1 − β have a high shock and sell n0 − nH1s projects.
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This yields the following definition of equilibrium:
DEFINITION 1. A competitive equilibrium is described by asset prices ps for s ∈ {g, b}
and bank choices x0 ∈ R3+ and xz1s ∈ R2+ for s ∈ {g, b} and z ∈ {H,L} satisfying
1. Optimality. The bank’s choices maximize E [Πzs] subject to x0 ∈ B0 and xz1s ∈ Bz1s (x0),
taking asset prices as given.
2. Market clearing. For s ∈ {g, b}, the bank’s choices satisfy
n0 −
(
βnL1s + (1− β)nH1s
)
≥ 0 (7)
Furthermore, ps ≥ p, and if (7) is a strict inequality, then ps = p.
Parametric assumptions. The following assumption makes the analysis of fire sales in-
teresting:






v1b < (1− v2b) (1− h) (9)
The first condition ensures that aggregate bank liquidity is high in the good state, so that
banks never have to sell assets to outside buyers in equilibrium. The second condition ensures
that aggregate liquidity is low enough in the bad state to make fire sales a possibility.
14
Moreover, I impose a condition guaranteeing that bank debt is risk free in the baseline model.
As discussed above, this requires a lower bound on the haircut h.
ASSUMPTION 2. For all n¯0 ∈ [0, e0/h], the haircut satisfies
h > 1− p+ r (n¯0) (10)
This condition states that at t = 1, the bank can always sell its assets in the secondary
market, service its outstanding debt and interest obligations, and have cash left over. Thus,
it has positive continuation value at t = 1 and will not default.
4 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
Bank profits. The bank earns a basic expected net return of R on each of the (n0 + n¯0)
projects it invests in. It has to pay interest on long-term debt and incurs monitoring costs.
Hence, its expected basic profits are
R (n0 + n¯0)− r (n¯0)− g (n0 + n¯0) (11)
The bank may also make profits or losses from trading projects in the secondary market
at t = 1. By virtue of Assumption 1, projects will be priced fairly in the good state in
equilibrium, pg = v2g. There are two relevant scenarios in the bad state: Projects can be
priced fairly (pb = v2b) or underpriced (pb < v2b). The proof of Lemma 1 verifies that these
are the only possibilities.
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If projects are priced fairly, then the bank cannot gain or lose from trading. If they are
underpriced, the bank will optimally hold as many projects at as possible in the bad state.
From the budget (5), it follows that this is achieved by holding no cash, i.e. setting cz1b = 0






On each asset sold, the bank loses v2b − pb (it gains when the net sale is negative).
The bad state occurs with probability α, so that expected trading losses are α (v2b − pb)
times the expected net sale. Using the definition of equity ez1s in (4), the budget constraint
(3) and the fact that E [εz] = 0, expected trading losses are
φ (pb) [(n0 + n¯0) (1− pb (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− pb) (1− h)− e0] (13)
where φ (pb) = α (v2b − pb) /pbh.
The term in square brackets is the bank’s expected liquidity shortfall, which measures the
difference between its t = 1 equity and the amount required to hold on to n0 assets. The
factor φ (pb) is the marginal value of bank liquidity at t = 1. It is the product of the likelihood
of the bad state, the undervaluation of projects, and the number of assets that can be bought
with one unit of liquidity, which is 1/pbh. Lemma 1 summarizes this characterization of bank
profits.





The bank’s expected profits satisfy E [Πs] = V (x0, pb), and its choices solve the problem
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maxx0∈B0 V (x0, pb), where
V (x0, pb) = R (n0 + n¯0)− r (n¯0)− g (n0 + n¯0)
− φ (pb) [(n0 + n¯0) (1− pb (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− pb) (1− h)− e0] (14)
Optimality conditions. Assuming that the solution to the bank’s maximization problem
is interior, its choices are characterized by two marginal conditions:
r′ (n¯?0) = φ (pb) (1− pb) (1− h) (15)
R− g′ (n?0 + n¯?0) = φ (pb) [1− pb (1− h)− v1b] (16)
Equation (15) determines optimal maturity structure. The left-hand side is the marginal cost
of long-term funding, driven by creditors’ liquidity preference. The right-hand side is the
marginal liquidity cost of short-term funding. It is equal to the marginal value of liquidity
times the liquidity injection required to roll over short-term debt.
Equation (16) determines optimal investment. The left-hand side is the marginal basic
profit of investment in projects, net of monitoring costs. The right-hand side is the marginal
benefit of cash, driven by the fact that cash offers liquidity in the bad state. It is equal
to the marginal value of liquidity times the decrease in the expected shortfall when cash is
substituted for projects.
Appendix B derives parametric conditions that guarantee an interior solution.
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4.1 Fire sales
When there is an aggregate liquidity shortfall at t = 1, banks must sell assets to outside
buyers. By the law of large numbers, the aggregate liquidity shortfall is the same as the
expected liquidity shortfall of an individual bank, i.e. the term in square brackets in (13).
If this is positive, the banking sector is an aggregate net seller of projects in the bad state.
Consequently, there is a fire sale and the price drops to the valuation of outside buyers p.
This paper focuses on situations where fire sales happen in competitive equilibrium. This
occurs when investment in projects is sufficiently attractive, and when long-term debt is
sufficiently costly. In that case, banks find it worthwhile to invest a large proportion of
their initial equity in projects funded by short-term debt, and hold few cash reserves, which
naturally creates an aggregate liquidity shortfall.
Projects are attractive when the net present value R is high. Long-term debt is costly when
creditors have a strong liquidity preference, which corresponds to a high return q on their
potential investments. Proposition 1 demonstrates that high values of R and q indeed lead
to fire sales in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. There are two thresholds Rf > 0 and qf > 0, which are functions
of the parameters other than R and q, such that when R > Rf , and q > qf , the unique
competitive equilibrium has a fire sale, with pb = p.
In the remainder of the paper, I assume that there is a fire sale in equilibrium. Thus, I will
focus on the parametric region where R > Rf and q > qf .
I have assumed that there is some systematic risk in the economy (v1g > v1b), or equivalently,
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that there is positive correlation in cash flow risk across banks. If cash flow risk were entirely
idiosyncratic (v1b = v1g), fire sales would not arise, as banks with high cash flows would buy
assets from banks with low cash flows, and outside buyers would not need to get involved.
This is analogous to the point on aggregate liquidity shortages in Holmström and Tirole
(1998). In their model, there is no role for public liquidity provision when shocks are purely
idiosyncratic, since firms can insure each other. Here, there is no role for regulation when
cash flow shocks are purely idiosyncratic.
4.2 The cost of fire sales and systematic risk
Fire sales are a systematic phenomenon, as they are driven by aggregate illiquidity. I now
analyze how the cost of fire sales is affected by increases in systematic risk. Increased
systematic risk is captured by mean-preserving spreads in the aggregate cash flows v1s and
v2s.
Fire sales are costly because projects are sold to outside buyers, which destroys value. Outside
buyers do not make profits in a fire sale, since asset prices reflect their valuation p. Therefore,
the social cost of fire sales coincides with banks’ losses in equilibrium. These losses are equal
to (13), evaluated at the equilibrium price pb = p and the optimal choices n?0 and n¯?0.
Fire sale costs do not depend on the individual shock εz, and are unaffected by idiosyncratic
risk. They do, however, respond to changes in systematic risk. Proposition 2 explains their
response in detail.
PROPOSITION 2. A mean-preserving spread in v1s increases the equilibrium cost of fire
19
sales if and only if









Suppose the fire sale price (in the bad state) is proportional to v2b, with p = ηv2b, 0 < η < 1.
Then there exists a parameter-dependent threshold g2 > g1, such that a mean-preserving
spread in v2s increases the cost of fire sales if and only if g′′ (n?0 + n¯?0) > g2.
Suppose the fire sale price p does not depend on v2s. Then there exists a parameter-dependent
threshold G2 > g1 such that a mean-preserving spread in v2s increases the cost of fire sales
if and only if g′′ (n?0 + n¯?0) < G2.
To understand this result, note there are direct and indirect effects of increased systematic
risk. A mean preserving spread in v1s decreases v1b, which directly increases fire sale costs by
reducing cash flow liquidity. However, banks optimally react by investing less, which reduces
their liquidity shortfall and the cost of fire sales.9 Costs increase on balance when the first
effect dominates. This occurs when banks’ demand for investment is inelastic, i.e. when the
curvature of monitoring costs g′′ is big enough.
A mean-preserving spread in v2s decreases v2b. The effect depends on whether the fire sale
price p responds. Suppose first that it responds proportionally, with p = ηv2b. Then the











However, the fall in p directly increases fire sales costs by reducing the market value of
projects at time 1 and tightening the borrowing constraint. Banks react optimally by in-
vesting less and issuing more long-term debt, which reduces their liquidity shortfall. Costs
increase when the first effect dominates, which again happens when g′′ is big enough.
This reasoning is reversed when p is constant. In this case, the fall in v2b directly lowers
cost by diminishing the fire sales discount and lowering the marginal value of liquidity φ.
However, banks optimally respond to a lower φ by investing more and issuing less long-
term debt, which increases their liquidity shortfall. Costs increase when the second effect
dominates. This occurs when banks’ demand for investment is not too inelastic, i.e. when
g′′ is not too big.
An alternative interpretation of these results is in terms of the correlation between banks.
The correlation between the t = 1 cash flows of bank i and j is
Corr (v1s + εzi , v1s + εzj) =
1
1 + V ar (εz) /V ar (v1s)
(19)
A change in correlation affects the cost of fire sales if and only if it is driven by an increase in
systematic risk through V ar (v1s). If correlation changes due to changes in systematic risk
through V ar (εz), the costs are unaffected.
4.3 The social planner’s choice
I now study the choices of a benevolent planner who dictates t = 0 bank choices x0 =
(c0, n0, n¯0) but has to satisfy the bank’s budget constraint (3). He leaves banks to optimize
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given x0 and market prices at t = 1. His choices induce a planned equilibrium.
There are three types of agents: Banks, creditors and outside buyers. Creditors and outside
buyers are always indifferent between dealing with the bank and consuming their exogenous
endowment, so that their utility is the same in any planned equilibrium. Hence, the social
planner seeks to maximize expected bank profits in planned equilibrium. His optimal choices
are called constrained efficient. Constrained efficiency differs from full Pareto efficiency in
that my social planner cannot freely transfer wealth between groups of agents, e.g. between
creditors and banks.
One vector of social planner’s choices x0 may induce multiple planned equilibria. This is
due to a self-fulfilling debt-deflation spiral, which implies that both high and low asset prices
may clear the market: When asset prices are high, banks have no funding problems and do
not sell assets. When asset prices are low, banks are forced to sell. To facilitate the analysis,
I assume that the market selects the ’better’ equilibrium without a fire sale.
ASSUMPTION 3. If the social planner’s choices induce multiple planned equilibria, the
one with the highest equilibrium price pb is selected with probability 1.
It is helpful to examine what the social planner needs to do to avoid a fire sale. He has to
choose t = 0 investments such that fair pricing in all states (ps = v2s) is an equilibrium.
This can only be the case if, given fair prices, there is no aggregate liquidity shortfall.
LEMMA 2. In planned equilibrium prices satisfy pg = v2g. Furthermore, pb = v2b if the
planner’s choice x0 satisfies the ’no fire sale’ condition
(n0 + n¯0) (1− v2b (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− v2b) (1− h) ≤ e0 (20)
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and pb = p otherwise.10
This characterization illustrates the two basic trade-offs the planner faces if he wishes to
avoid a fire sale. First, he trades off investment in projects n0 + n¯0 against holding cash
reserves. The no fire sale condition is more likely to hold when cash reserves are high and
n0 + n¯0 is low, because cash provides a liquidity cushion. The downside is that projects have
a higher net present value than cash.
Second, the planner trades off short-term against long-term borrowing. The no fire sale
condition (20) is more likely to hold when long-term debt is used, since it alleviates the
rollover problem. However, long-term debt is expensive due to the social value of bank
maturity transformation.
4.4 Inefficiency of equilibrium
Recall that in competitive equilibrium, the bank invests much of its equity in projects funded
by short-term debt, which leads to a fire sale. I show that the competitive equilibrium is
potentially inefficient. For a range of parameter values, the social planner chooses not to
replicate banks’ choices in competitive equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3. There exists an open set of values R > Rf and q > qf for which
the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Then the unique constrained efficient




R (n0 + n¯0)− r (n¯0)− g (n0 + n¯0)
subject to (n0 + n¯0) (1− v2b (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− v2b) (1− h) ≤ e0 (21)
Aggregate actions in competitive equilibrium lead to a situation with fire sales and reduced
individual profitability. This creates a ’systemic risk externality’: The choices of individual
banks, by contributing to aggregate illiquidity and low equilibrium prices, reduce the prof-
itability of others. Thus, banks may be better off if they are forced to coordinate on lower
aggregate risk-taking by a social planner.
Systemic externalities are pecuniary externalities because they work through equilibrium
prices. Pecuniary externalities affect welfare when financial markets are incomplete (Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis 1985). Here, markets are incomplete due to binding borrowing con-
straints.11 Raising the equilibrium price relaxes this constraint, which benefits banks more
than it harms buyers. The argument of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) on the neutrality of
pecuniary externalities breaks down.
To understand the characterization of the efficient choice, note that when the competitive
equilibrium is constrained inefficient, the social planner will choose to prevent a fire sale in
the bad state by satisfying the no fire sales condition.Indeed, any choice that induces a fire
sale is dominated by a replication of the competitive equilibrium. Thus the planner wishes
to maximize profits subject to the no fire sale condition, as stated in the second part of
proposition 3.
24
4.5 A graphical illustration
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare analysis. The social planner dictates t = 0 bank investments
x0 = (c0, n0, n¯0). Given the project investments n0 and n¯0, cash holdings are determined by
the budget constraint in equation (3). There are two free choice variables, n0 and n¯0. The
feasible set is the area under the solid budget line, which has slope −1.
Leverage and maturity mismatch can be visualized in Figure 1. Leverage corresponds to a
high total number of projects n0 + n¯0. Leverage is high in the north-east of the figure, when
the choice is close to the budget line. Maturity mismatch corresponds to a high ratio of
short-term debt to total debt n0/ (n0 + n¯0). Maturity mismatch is high in the north-west of
the figure.
The dashed line illustrates the no fire sale condition (20). The social planner needs to choose
a point on or below the line to avoid a fire sale. The slope of the line is flatter than the budget
line, because substituting long-term debt for short-term debt alleviates liquidity issues.
The planner maximizes the objective in (21) subject to the no fire sales condition. The
isoprofit contours are level curves of the objective function, and are ellipses around the
unconstrained optimum at point A. Point A would be the choice of unregulated banks
given pb = v2b. Since A lies above the no fire sale condition, pb = v2b is not a competitive
equilibrium.
The constrained efficient point is at point B, where the isoprofit curves are tangent to the no
fire sale condition. This point features both reduced leverage and reduced maturity mismatch
compared to the unconstrained choice A.
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5 OPTIMALMACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
This section discusses how financial regulation can be used to avoid inefficient fire sales in a
decentralized equilibrium. In the language of Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011), regulation
against fire sales is macroprudential regulation, as it is concerned with aggregate behaviour
and systematic risk.
I consider two macroprudential tools: Constraint-based regulation and Pigouvian taxation.
Constraint-based regulation requires that bank choices x0 lie in some non-empty setQ0 ⊂ B0.
Pigouvian taxation requires banks to pay the regulator τ per unit of investment, and receive
a rebate ρ¯ per unit of investment which is funded by long-term debt. Each constraint-based
or Pigouvian regulatory regime induces a regulated equilibrium. Unlike in previous studies
of Pigouvian taxes against systemic risk, I model a two-tier tax regime. A simple tax would
not be able to achieve efficiency, as it cannot give nuanced incentives for reduced leverage
and maturity mismatch.
As in the previous section, I impose an assumption to deal with multiple regulated equilibria:
ASSUMPTION 4. If a regulatory regime induces multiple regulated equilibria, the one with
the highest equilibrium price pb is selected with probability 1.
5.1 Constraint-based regulation
By definition, a regulator can never do better than the social planner in Section 4.3. Hence, if
a regulated equilibrium is constrained efficient (i.e. if it replicates the planner’s choice), then





) is an optimal regulatory constraint. However, this regime offers no informational
advantage over outright centralization.
As an alternative, the regulator can impose a constraint which mimics the no fire sale condi-
tion (20). Under this constraint, the bank’s problem becomes to maximize profits subject to
’no fire sale’. But Proposition 3 shows that this is equivalent to finding the constrained effi-
cient investment. Hence, imposing the no fire sale condition leads to a constrained efficient
allocation in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4. The following regulatory constraint induces a constrained efficient reg-
ulated equilibrium:
Qmacro0 = {x0 ∈ B0| (n0 + n¯0) (1− v2b (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− v2b) (1− h) ≤ e0} (22)
In terms of the graphical analysis in Figure 1, suppose that the no fire sale condition is
imposed on banks as a constraint. Then their privately optimal choice will be where isoprofit
contours are tangent to the regulatory constraint. This point coincide with the constrained
efficient point B, yielding an efficient allocation in regulated equilibrium.
The optimal rule (22) is remarkably simple in two ways. First, if she can observe the
bank’s balance sheet, the regulator only needs to know three parameters to impose Qmacro0 :
Aggregate cash flows in the bad state v1b and v2b, and the haircut h. Second, it is linear in
banks’ investment choices.
It is easy to see why a linear constraint is optimal in the current model. The optimal rule
mimics the no fire sale condition (20). This reduces to the requirement that bank equity at
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t = 1, which is a linear function of investment choices, must be above a certain threshold
to avoid an aggregate liquidity shortfall. Therefore, even though the marginal value of bank
liquidity φ is non-linear, the optimal regulation to ensure sufficient bank liquidity is linear.12
This is a key result of this paper. A simple linear rule is fully efficient, in the sense that it
achieves the same level of welfare as a benevolent planner. The generality of this conclusion
is discussed at the end of this section.
In contrast, a central planner generally needs to know all parameters of the model to solve the
full optimization problem (21). This comparison illustrates the considerable informational
advantage of constraint-based regulation over centralization. Limited knowledge of the value
of investment R, monitoring costs g or funding costs r, for instance, does not render this
policy ineffective.13 Intuitively, the constraint Qmacro0 gives banks the incentive to use their
information efficiently, without the regulator having to obtain it.
5.2 Pigouvian taxation
The purpose of taxes is to ensure that banks’ optimal choices when there is no fire sale
(pb = v2b) coincide with the choices of the social planner (xE0 ). Under this condition, the
regulated equilibrium with taxes will be constrained efficient.
The representative bank’s problem when pb = v2b is to maximize V (x0, v2b) net of taxes. Its
first-order conditions are now
R− g′ (n?0 + n¯?0) = τ (23)
r′ (n¯?0) = ρ¯ (24)
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An efficient tax regime must ensure that these choices coincide with the social planner’s. By
taking the first-order condition of the planner’s program (21), it is easy obtain the following
characterization.
PROPOSITION 5. The unique tax regime inducing a constrained efficient regulated equi-
librium is
τ = λ [1− v2b (1− h)− v1b] (25)
ρ¯ = λ (1− v2b) (1− h) (26)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the no fire sale condition at the solution
of the social planner’s problem (21).
This proposition shows that a two-tier Pigouvian tax can achieve efficiency. However, it does
not compare favourably with constraint-based regulation when it comes to informational
requirements. In order to pick the optimal tax regime τ and ρ¯, the regulator needs to know
the cash flow parameters v1b, v2b and the haircut h. In addition, she needs to know the social
planner’s Lagrange multiplier λ, which measures the social value of aggregate bank liquidity
in the bad state.
In particular, one can use the planner’s first-order condition to solve for λ, which yields











The efficient tax rates are functions of the planner’s optimal choices nE0 and n¯E0 . In general,
these choices depend on all parameters of the model. Consequently, it appears that Pigouvian
taxes are efficient, but more complex to implement than constraint-based regulation.
5.3 Implementation and Basel III
Capital requirements are insufficient to implement the optimal macroprudential regulation.
They treat all debt equally, and cannot provide the differential treatment of long-term and
short-term borrowing that is prescribed by Qmacro0 . To see this, note that traditional capi-
tal regulation would bound the ratio of equity to risky investment, yielding the constraint
e0/(n0 + n¯0) ≤ κ for some κ. In Figure 1, this constraint would run parallel to the bank’s
budget constraint. It is easy to see that bank choices subject to this constraint would not,
in general, coincide with the constrained efficient allocation at point B. I will return to the
merits of capital regulation when discussing microprudential concerns in Section 6.
The Basel III Accord (BIS 2010) introduces two new tools to target liquidity: Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirements. Both can be
used to implement optimal regulation in my model.
Net Stable Funding Ratio. The NSFR requirement works as follows:
1. Available stable funding (ASF) is a weighted sum of bank liabilities. Liabilities which
lead to liquidity shortfalls have low weights.
2. Required stable funding (RSF) is a weighted sum of bank assets. Illiquid assets which
cannot be sold easily have high weights.
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3. The NSFR is calculated as the ratio of available to required stable funding. The
regulatory constraint is ASF/RSF ≥ 1.
Using the budget constraint (3), the optimal constraint Qmacro0 can be written as
ASF
RSF
= e0 + (1− v2b) (1− h) n¯0[1− v2b (1− h)− v1b] (n0 + n¯0) ≥ 1 (29)
This formulation allows me to provide practical guidance for the calibration of weights in
the NSFR requirement. In the numerator, equity receives a weight of 100%, whereas long-
term debt (1− h) n¯0 receives a lower weight of (1− v2b) < 1. Long-term debt is not quite
as ’stable’ as equity, because it obliges the bank to pledge assets as collateral, reducing its
liquidity in a crisis as these assets cannot be pledged against new debt.
In the denominator, liquid cash receives zero weight. Projects receive a weight equal to
1− v2b (1− h)− v1b ∈ (0, 1). Their ’stability weight’ is lower when systematic cash flow risk
is high and when funding conditions are tight (high h), since both factors exacerbate rollover
problems.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio. The LCR requirement works as follows:
1. Net cash outflows (NCO) are a weighted sum of bank liabilities. Liabilities which are
withdrawn by creditors in a 30-day stress test scenario (determined by the regulator)
have high weights.
2. High quality liquid assets (HQLA) are a weighted sum of bank assets. Illiquid assets
have low weights.
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3. The LCR is calculated as the ratio of high quality liquid assets to net cash outflows.
The regulatory constraint is HQLA/NCO ≥ 1.
The optimal constraint Qmacro0 can also be written as
HQLA
NCO
= c0 + (n0 + n¯0) v1b(1− v2b) (1− h)n0 ≥ 1 (30)
This yields practical insights for the design of ’liquidity weights’ and the stress test scenario
underlying the NCO. In the numerator, liquid cash receives a 100% weight, and projects
receive a weight that is equal to their liquidity contribution in the bad state, v1b < 1. In the
denominator, representing the optimal stress-test scenario, long-term debt and equity are
not withdrawn, whereas a proportion (1− v2b) of short-term debt (1− h)n0 is withdrawn.
The withdrawal rate on short-term debt is lower when systematic long-term risk is high,
since this erodes the value of projects as collateral in a crisis, again exacerbating rollover
problems.
In sum, my model supports the application of new macroprudential ratios which jointly
target capital and liquidity. I remain agnostic about which of the new tools in Basel III
is preferable; either tool can achieve efficiency. The Basel committee’s proposals include
both due to worries about systemic risk at different time horizons. The LCR’s weights
are designed with short-term risk in mind, while the NSFR focuses on longer-term stability.
This is not captured by my three-period model, and richer dynamics justify the use of several
constraints, as is shown in the next subsection. However, the equivalence demonstrated here
is general to an extent: For example, two LCR’s, with different weights, can achieve the same
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constraint as a combination of LCR and NSFR, which would perhaps be more parsimonious
than the current Basel framework.
5.4 Robustness of the optimal regulation
I examine whether the linearity and simplicity of Qmacro0 is an artifact of my simple model
economy. An obvious first observation is that if project cash flows did not exhibit constant
returns to scale, the no fire sale condition would not be linear. One response is that a first-
order approximation of the condition would still be linear, and that this may offer a useful
regulatory benchmark. Another response is that the assumption of constant returns, a stan-
dard in the banking literature, is quite reasonable. Financial assets and loans to households
and businesses with similar characteristics have a natural constant-returns property.
A more interesting question is whether the static nature of the model or the binary nature of
fire sales (outside buyers demand any quantity at price p, but nothing at any higher price)
are driving the result. Moreover, it is interesting to examine the effect of allowing banks to
issue equity at t = 1. The following extensions address these concerns.
Dynamic extension. Consider an extension of the model until time T > 2, where the
individual and aggregate states, st ∈ {g, b} and zit ∈ {H,L} for t ≥ 1, evolve according to
independent Markov chains. For simplicity, I continue to assume that project investment
and long-term borrowing only takes place at t = 0. For period t, let vt denote the per-unit
cash flow of projects, ct−1 the aggregate cash holdings, and nt−1 the amount of projects held
by banks and pledged against short-term debt between t− 1 and t.14 Denote the fair value




for t ≥ 1. It is then possible to repeat the steps above to
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show that the condition for no fire sale in period t is
nt−1 (pt−1 − pˆt) (1− h)− (nt−1 + n¯0) vt − ct−1 ≤ 0 (31)
where p0 ≡ 1. If a social planner wants to prevent fire sales, he will maximize bank profits
subject to a series of such linear conditions. Thus, imposing linear constraints on banks
period-by-period would again sufficient to induce efficiency.
Partial fire sales. In my model, outside buyers demand any quantity of projects at the
fixed fire sale price p. An alternative assumption is that they have a general downward-
sloping inverse demand function for projects. Their demand for projects in state s ∈ {g, b}
is max {0, D (ps)}, where D′ (ps) < 0 and D (v2b) ≤ 0. Recall that the number of assets sold
by banks in the bad aggregate state is equal to 1/pbh times the aggregate liquidity shortfall.
Market clearing now requires that15
D (pb) =
(n0 + n¯0) (1− pb (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− pb) (1− h)− e0
pbh
(32)
In this extension, the social planner might settle for a ’partial fire sale’, aiming for an




and adjusting bank investments to satisfy (32). Let pEb denote
the price in the optimal planned equilibrium. As noted by Lorenzoni (2008), calculating pEb
is difficult because the planner’s problem is not concave in general. However, in any case,
the planner’s choice of bank investment xE0 will be most profitable choice that satisfies (32)
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The planner’s choice still maximizes bank profits subject to a linear condition, which means
that it can be decentralized with a linear regulatory constraint. However, the informa-
tional efficiency of constraint-based regulation is compromised. Solving this problem requires
knowledge of pEb , the socially optimal price level, which generally depends on all parameters
of the model.
In conclusion, it appears that the optimality of a linear regulatory rule is fairly general, while
its informational efficiency partly depends on the baseline model’s assumption that fire sale
prices are fixed.
However, I would argue that the informational efficiency is preserved in a heuristic sense.
Even with partial fire sales, a regulator can simplify her decision by solving a realistic two-
step problem. First, she can decide how much of a drop in asset prices she is willing to
tolerate. Conditional on this decision, she can implement the optimal policy with a linear
constraint which, as in the baseline model, requires little information.
Equity issuance at t = 1. Fire sales occur when banks are unable to raise sufficient
funding in the bad state at t = 1. Suppose that banks can raise new equity eˆ in this state,
but that investors require an excess return on equity of χeˆ, where χ > 0. This excess return
is a cost from the bank’s perspective.16 For simplicity only, suppose that banks choose eˆ
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before observing their idiosyncratic shock zi. An extra unit of equity reduces a bank’s net
sale in (12) by 1/pbh units. Each unit sold loses the bank v2b−pb, so that the marginal value
of equity is (v2b−pb)/pbh. Therefore, banks will issue equity eˆ > 0 only if the value of equity
exceeds its cost, or
χ ≤ v2b − pb
pbh
(34)
If assets are priced fairly (pb = v2b), then (34) does not hold and banks choose eˆ = 0. Banks’
optimal choices when pb = v2b are therefore the same as in the baseline model without equity
issuance. Thus, if these is a fire sale in the baseline model (e.g. if R and q are large in
the sense of Proposition 1), then prices must also fall below v2b in the model with equity
issuance.
The structure of equilibrium depends on the cost of equity χ. If equity is costly enough to
satisfy χ > (v2b−p)/ph, then banks never issue equity. In this case, the equilibrium exhibits
a fire sale (pb = p) as in the baseline model, and the analysis of welfare and macroprudential
regulation is unchanged.
If equity costs are intermediate with χ ≤ (v2b − p)/ph, the equilibrium has p ≤ pb < v2b,
and banks raise just enough equity to avoid selling assets. The welfare analysis in this case
depends on whether χ is interpreted as a private or social cost of equity. If it is a purely
private cost, such as a transfer from banks to investors, then the case for macroprudential
regulation is weakened. If it is a social deadweight cost, macroprudential regulation is as
valuable as in the baseline model, and the optimal constraint Qmacro0 is unchanged.
In sum, macroprudential regulation can be motivated by the desire to avoid the social costs
of emergency equity issuance, as well as by the desire to avoid fire sales. In either case,
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optimal regulation takes the shape of the linear rule Qmacro0 .
6 OPTIMAL MICROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
This section drops Assumption 2, which ensured that all bank debt was risk-free in the
baseline model. A bank defaults at t = 1 if bad news have driven its continuation value
below zero.Since all uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, there is no loss of generality in assuming
that all default decisions are made at this date.
Bank resolution causes a deadweight social cost of κ ≥ 0 times the measure of defaulting
banks. The parameter κ captures administrative costs of resolution and the wider social
costs of credit crunches and disruptions to intermediation and payment systems. I impose a
parametric assumption which ensures that default is possible:
ASSUMPTION 5. The individual shock |εL| satisfies








In this setting, additional regulation may be required to curb the social cost of bank default.
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) define this as microprudential regulation.
Agents’ payoffs upon default depend on the precise mechanism of bank resolution. I make
two assumptions. First, short-term debt enjoys seniority over long-term debt, and the bank’s
choices are safe enough to keep short-term debt risk-free. Second, the bank’s asset goes to a
receiver upon default. The receiver pays back short-term creditors at t = 1, runs the bank
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as efficiently as a banker, and then passes the (maximized) proceeds to long-term creditors
at t = 2. These conditions simplify the analysis by ensuring that the constraint Qmacro0
continues to rule out fire sales. If short-term debt were risky or the receiver inefficient, bank
default would exacerbate the fire sale, creating a need for stricter macroprudential regulation
as well as an additional microprudential constraint. I also continue to assume that we are
in the parametric region where it is efficient to prevent a fire sale.
PROPOSITION 6. When κ = 0, the constraint Qmacro0 as defined in (22) induces a con-
strained efficient regulated equilibrium. When κ is sufficiently large, the constraint Qmacro0 ∩
Qmicro0 induces a constrained efficient equilibrium, where
Qmicro0 = {x0 ∈ B0| (n0 + n¯0) (1− v1b − εL − v2b) + r (n¯0) ≤ e0} (36)
Without deadweight costs, the macroprudential constraint Qmacro0 remains sufficient for effi-
ciency. Long-term interest rates reflect default risk as well as the liquidity premium. This
leads the bank to internalize the losses of long-term creditors in default, and there is no
additional externality. With κ > 0, nobody will internalize the social deadweight cost, and
the regulated equilibrium may be inefficient.
When κ is large, the planner, who maximizes bank profits net of deadweight costs, chooses
to rule out bank default. A necessary and sufficient condition is that a bank with a low
individual shock (z = L) in the bad aggregate state (s = b) has a non-negative continuation
value.
This translates to the requirement that bank choices lie in the set Qmicro0 . Proceeding as in
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the analysis of fire sales, the planner’s choices maximize bank profits subject to the no fire
sale condition and Qmicro0 . Consequently, it is efficient to impose both constraints on banks.
Interaction between macro- and microprudential regulation. Micro- and macropru-
dential regulation both constrain the risk-taking of banks. Thus, one would expect them
to be substitutes. However, they are not perfect substitutes, because they target different
types of risk. In particular, macroprudential regulation is more concerned with maturity
mismatch than microprudential regulation.
I analyze substitutability from two angles. First, I show that one regulation can substitute
for the other and achieve full efficiency, but that this substitutability is imperfect in that
it depends on parameter values. Second, I consider the ’partial efficiency’ goals of ruling
out default (for microprudential regulation) and preventing fire sales (for macroprudential
regulation), and show that each instrument may need to become tougher to achieve its partial
efficiency goal when the other instrument is removed.
If the regulator has perfect information, efficiency can always be achieved with one constraint.
I focus on a more nuanced case where the regulator observes the parameters of the constraints
Qmacro0 and Qmicro0 , but need not know the remaining parameters of the model, such as
expected returns R or the cost of investment g(n0 + n¯0).
PROPOSITION 7. If the individual shock satisfies |εL| ≥ hv2b, then microprudential
regulation is sufficient for efficiency.
If |εL| < hv2b, then macroprudential regulation is sufficient for efficiency if the solution to
max
x0∈Qmacro0
R (n0 + n¯0)− r (n¯0)− g (n0 + n¯0) (37)
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lies in the set Qmicro0 for all possible parameter values.
If bad individual shocks are sufficiently severe (i.e. if |εL| is large), then microprudential
regulation needs to be very tough to rule out default. The microprudential constraint on
bank leverage is so tight that, regardless of banks’ maturity mismatch, their choices satisfy
the no fire sale condition. An additional macroprudential constraint is not required.
If individual shocks are not severe, the macroprudential constraint on bank leverage prevents
the default of banks with adverse individual shocks. However, macroprudential regulation
can never rule out default in general. For instance, macroprudential regulation would allow
banks to invest the maximal amount and fund it entirely with long-term debt (the point
n¯0 = e0/h and n0 = c0 = 0 always lies in the set Qmacro0 ). Banks with adverse shocks may still
default given this choice, as they are weighed down by large outstanding interest. Therefore,
the second part of the proposition appropriately qualifies the sufficiency of macroprudential
regulation.
Proposition 7 suggests imperfect substitutability of micro- and macroprudential regulation.
In certain circumstances, but not generally, one instrument can be sufficient for efficiency
and substitute for the other. Because there are only two aggregate and two individual states,
policy decisions are binary here: It is either optimal to rule out fire sales and defaults, or to
allow them. As a result, substitutability is also binary. When one regulation is introduced,
the other regulation either becomes redundant or remains fully optimal. In a richer setting
with continuous policy decisions, substitutability would also be more gradual.
So far I have held the constraints Qmicro0 and Qmacro0 constant and considered full efficiency.
There is another type of substitutability in terms of ’partial efficiency’ goals.
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On the one hand, when macroprudential regulation is removed, the microprudential con-
straint may need to become tougher to rule out defaults. The absence of macroprudential
regulation may trigger a fire sale in the bad aggregate state. Then, the continuation value
of a bank with a low individual shock drops, as it makes losses on forced asset sales. It is
easy to show that the microprudential constraint required to rule out default in this case is
strictly tighter than in (36).
On the other hand, when microprudential regulation is removed, the macroprudential con-
straint does not change, since aggregate liquidity shortfalls are unaffected by individual
defaults. Macroprudential policy is indifferent to the removal of microprudential rules, but
the indifference hinges on the assumption that the receiver of defaulting banks is efficient.
Consider the case of an inefficient receiver who sells defaulting banks’ assets into the sec-
ondary market immediately at t = 1. In this case, the net supply of assets in the secondary
market strictly increases when there is default, and the macroprudential constraint required
to rule out fire sales becomes strictly tighter than (22).
Informational requirements. The macroprudential part of the optimal regulation re-
quires the same information as before: v1b, v2b and h. The microprudential part requires
these three parameters plus the idiosyncratic shock εL and the interest payment on long-
term debt r (n¯0). Regulating against default is more informationally costly than regulating
against fire sales, as both ’micro’ and ’macro’ information is necessary.
Note that there is considerable overlap in the information required for micro- and macropru-
dential regulation. This exposes a potential weakness of recent reforms. Many governments
have established macroprudential regulators which are institutionally separate from existing
41
microprudential agencies. This dichotomy may inhibit information sharing between agen-
cies. My model shows that information sharing is indeed valuable, as optimal micro- and
macroprudential regulations depend on many common factors.
Implementation. In the Basel regulatory framework, the optimal microprudential con-




≥ 1− v1b − εb − v2b + r (n¯0)
n0 + n¯0
(38)
The left-hand side is just as in a traditional capital requirement - the ratio of equity capital
to risky assets. Unlike in a traditional capital requirement, which constrains this ratio to
lie above a constant value, the right-hand side is modified to account for interest payments.
This is because banks may default due to high outstanding interest payments, not just due
to a high face value of debt. However, this term may be negligible if interest rates are close
to zero, so that a capital requirement would be approximately optimal.
7 TIME-VARYING REGULATION, RISKMEASURES
AND PERSISTENCE
Many commentators have isolated the lack of time-variation in financial policy as one of
its key flaws prior to 2008 (Brunnermeier et al. 2009, Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 2011).
They emphasize that new macroprudential tools should be applied in a time-varying fashion,
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with the stringency of rules adapting to the business cycle, credit conditions and fluctuating
systematic risk. My model supports this point, as the optimal macroprudential regulation
depends on the economy’s risk profile.
The optimal macroprudential constraint Qmacro0 in (22) does not depend on the individual
shock z, and changes in idiosyncratic risk do not affect macroprudential regulation. Changes
in systematic risk do matter. Their precise implications depend whether long-term or short-
term cash flows are affected.
A mean-preserving spread in v1s decreases v1b, so that the (positive) coefficient on total
investment (n0 + n¯0) in Qmacro0 increases. Risky investments now provide less liquidity in
the bad state, and regulation must be tougher on leverage. A mean preserving spread in
v2s decreases v2b, so that the coefficient on total investment increases and the coefficient on
investment funded by long-term debt n¯0 decreases (becomes more negative). With a decrease
in future asset values, borrowing constraints at t = 1 are tighter, rollover problems are more
severe, and regulation must be tougher on both leverage and maturity mismatch.
Moreover, one can interpret a mean-preserving spread in v2s as an increase in the persistence
of macroeconomic shocks. Consider a model in which the aggregate t = 1 cash flows are
described by v1s = v¯1 + us, where v¯1 is a basic cash flow and us is a macroeconomic shock
satisfying E [us] = 0. Suppose further that t = 2 cash flows are v2s = v¯2 + ϕus, where ϕ > 0
measures the persistence of the shock us. An increase in the persistence ϕ corresponds to a
mean-preserving spread in v2s. From the preceding analysis, it follows that regulation should
respond to increased persistence by being tougher on both leverage and maturity mismatch.
Another risk measure is the tightness of funding conditions, captured by the haircut h. When
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h falls, the coefficient on total investment increases, and the coefficient on n¯0 decreases (be-
comes more negative). With relaxed funding conditions, banks lever up more, exacerbating
rollover problems, and regulation must again be tougher on leverage and maturity mismatch.
Finally, Section 6 shows that microprudential regulation should also adapt to changes in
risk. The optimal microprudential constraint Qmicro0 in (36) depends on both systematic and
idiosyncratic risk. A mean-preserving spread in either v1s, v2s or εz raises the coefficient on
total investment (n0 + n¯0). All increased risk implies default risk, regardless of its source,
and regulation must become stricter on leverage.
This leads to another critique of the dichotomy between macro- and microprudential regu-
lation. Neither time-variation nor a concern with systematic risk are exclusively macropru-
dential issues. They should be part of the micro- and the macroprudential toolkit.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on an economy where banks have incentives to create excessive systemic
risk through leverage and maturity mismatch. I show that efficiency can be achieved through
a relatively simple linear macroprudential constraint on banks’ balance sheets, which requires
less information than central planning or Pigouvian taxation. The Liquidity Coverage and
Net Stable Funding ratios of Basel III are both capable of implementing the optimal policy.
Macroprudential regulation should react to changes in systematic risk in the economy and
credit conditions over the business cycle, but not to changes in the idiosyncratic risk of
individual institutions.
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In an extended model with potential socially costly bank failures, additional microprudential
regulation against default is needed. This can be implemented with a constraint resembling
a capital adequacy requirement, and needs to track changes in both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk.
While my results offer support for recent regulatory reforms, they shed a critical light on
the emerging view of macro- and microprudential regulation as separate tasks. Micro- and
macroprudential regulators are substitutes and benefit from the exchange of information,
which speaks against institutional separation. Moreover, my analysis demonstrates that
both types of regulation ought to be time-varying and react to changes in systematic risk.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1
Given the argument in the text, it remains to be verified that in any competitive equilibrium,
asset prices satisfy (i) p ≤ ps ≤ v2s and (ii) pg = v2g.
(i) Suppose ps > v2s for some s. Then the bank optimally sells all projects at t = 1 in state
s, nz1s = 0. By market clearing, it follows that n0 = 0. Now consider the other state s′ 6= s.
We have ps′ ≥ v2s′ , because otherwise, the bank would choose n1s′ > 0 and the market would
not clear. Hence ps ≥ v2s for all s ∈ {g, b}. But then it is easy to show that the bank would
optimally set n0 > 0, a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that v2g > pg ≥ p. Then it is optimal for the bank to buy as many projects as
possible, setting nz1g = ez1g/pgh. Using (4) for ez1g and E [εz] = 0, this yields
n0 −
(
βnL1s + (1− β)nH1s
)
= n0 [(1− pg) (1− h)− v1g]− n¯0v1g − c0
pgh
< 0
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that one of n0, c0 and n¯0 is
strictly positive by (3). This contradicts market clearing.
Proof of Proposition 1
The aggregate liquidity shortfall chosen by the bank given the price pb is
(n?0 + n¯?0) [1− pb (1− h)− v1b]− (1− pb) (1− h) n¯?0 − e0
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where n?0 and n¯?0 are defined by (15) and (16). We have d (n?0 + n¯?0) /dR > 0 and, since
r′ (n¯0) is increasing in q for all n¯0, dn¯?0/dq < 0. Thus, the aggregate liquidity shortfall is
increasing in R and q. As R and q become large, holding other parameters fixed, optimal
choices converge to the corner solution n¯?0 = 0, n?0 = e0h and c
?





this limit, the aggregate liquidity shortfall is strictly positive by Assumption 1.
Therefore, we can find two numbers Rf > 0 and qf > 0 such that R = Rf and q = qf implies
min
pb∈[p,v2b]
(n?0 + n¯?0) [1− pb (1− h)− v1b]− (1− pb) (1− h) n¯?0 − e0 = 0
When R > Rf and q > qf , the aggregate liquidity shortfall is strictly positive for all possible
pb. Therefore, the unique equilibrium price is pb = p by Definition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let k =
(










, y?0 = (n?0 + n¯?0). The cost of
fire sales in equilibrium is φ
[
ky?0 − k¯n¯?0 − e0
]
.
(i) Mean-preserving spread in v1s. The cost does not depend on v1g and by an application of








This is negative, implying that the mean-preserving spread increases cost, if and only if
g′′ > g1 as required.
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(ii) Mean-preserving spread in v2s with p = ηv2b. The cost does not depend on v2g, nor on
v2b directly, since v2b cancels out in the expression for φ. However, it depends on p, and














− (y?0 − n¯?0)
]
When g′′ = g1, the terms involving y?0 cancel and the expression is strictly positive. As
g′′ → ∞, the expression becomes strictly negative. Hence it is negative if g′′ is sufficiently
far above g1 as required.
(iii) Mean-preserving spread in v2b with p fixed. The cost (13) does not depend on v2g and it
only depends on v2b through φ, which is strictly increasing in v2b. Its derivative with respect
to φ is
[
























When g′′ = g1, the terms involving y?0 cancel and the expression is strictly negative. By
continuity, it is negative when when g′′ is not too far above g1, as required.
Proof of Lemma 2
By a parallel argument to Lemma 1, prices in planned equilibrium satisfy p ≤ pb ≤ v2b and
pg = v2g (as long as n0 > 0). First, suppose the planner’s choices satisfy (20). If pb = v2b
then banks are indifferent between all feasible t = 1 investments, the aggregate liquidity
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shortfall is non-positive by (20), and it is feasible for banks to set βnL1s + (1− β)nH1s = n0.
Thus pb = v2b is an equilibrium price, and will be selected by Assumption 3. Second, suppose
the planner’s choices do not satisfy (20). Then for all p ≤ pb ≤ v2b, the aggregate liquidity
shortfall is positive, because it is positive for pb = v2b and decreasing in pb. All feasible bank
choices then have βnL1s + (1− β)nH1s < n0. Thus pb = p is the only equilibrium price.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Inefficiency. I show that for R and δ sufficiently close to Rf and qf , there exists a choice
xA0 ∈ B0 such that the planned equilibrium induced by xA0 yields higher profits for the banks
than the competitive equilibrium. Define
σˆ = min
pb∈[p,v2b]
(n?0 + n¯?0) [1− pb (1− h)− v1b]− (1− pb) (1− h) n¯?0 − e0
and let pˆ denote any minimizer of the right-hand side. From the definition of Rf and qf
(see the proof of Proposition 1) and Berge’s maximum theorem, it follows that σˆ ↓ 0 as




. I prove that there is a welfare-
improving choice in two steps.
First, suppose pˆf > p. Making the dependence of optimal choices on prices explicit, consider
the choice xA0 , defined by nA0 = n?0 (pˆ) −  and n¯A0 = n¯?0 (pˆ), where  ≥ 0 is chosen to ensure
that the choices satisfy the no fire sale condition with equality if necessary. Define the bank’s
indirect utility asW (pb) = maxx0∈B0 V (x0, pb). I show that as (R, q) ↓ (Rf , qf ), the planned
equilibrium yields higher limiting profits than the competitive equilibrium. It is easy to see
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that  ↓ 0, so that the planned equilibrium induced by xA0 yields limiting profits equal to




. It remains to be shown that




in the limit. By the envelope theorem and the fact that σˆ ↓ 0, the limiting





Second, suppose pˆf = p. Suppose the social planner picks nA0 = n?0 (pˆ) and n¯A0 = n¯?0 (pˆ). For
R and q sufficiently close to Rf and qf , these choices satisfy the no fire sales condition, so













. By the envelope theorem, we














, which is equal to welfare
in competitive equilibrium. This is inefficient by assumption, so a choice inducing pb = v2b
must be optimal. The planner then maximizes V (x0, v2b) subject to (20) as required.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) κ = 0. By assumption, the efficient choice maximizes bank profits, which are zero in
states where the bank defaults, subject to (20), which continues to guarantee no fire sale due
to the assumptions about resolution. This again coincides with the bank’s objective when
constraint Qmacro0 is imposed.
(ii) κ large. The efficient choice maximizes bank profits minus κ times the measure of
defaulting banks, subject to (20). It is easy to see that as κ→∞, since profits are bounded
above, this converges to a choice where default is ruled out. This choice must maximize bank
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profits subject to (20) and the requirement that the bank’s continuation value is positive in
every state at t = 1. Since vtg > vtb and εH > εL, it is sufficient that the continuation
value is positive in state (b, L). Given that (20) is satisfied, we have pb = v2b, and positive
continuation value is equivalent to
(v1b + εL + v2b) (n0 + n¯0) + c0 − (1− h) (n0 + n¯0)− r (n¯0) ≥ 0
By the budget (3), this is in turn equivalent to the proposed requirement Qmicro0 .
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) Sufficiency of microprudential regulation. Microprudential regulation is sufficient for
efficiency if Qmicro0 ⊂ Qmacro0 . Suppose |εL| ≥ hv2b and x0 ∈ Qmicro0 . Then we have
(n0 + n¯0) (1− v2b (1− h)− v1b)− n¯0 (1− v2b) (1− h) ≤ (n0 + n¯0) (1− v2b (1− h)− v1b)
= (n0 + n¯0) [(1− v1b − εL − v2b)− (|εL| − hv2b)] ≤ e0
where the last inequality follows from the definition of Qmicro0 and r (n¯0) ≥ 0. Thus, x0 ∈
Qmacro0 , implying Qmicro0 ⊂ Qmacro0 as required.
(ii) Sufficiency of macroprudential regulation. Given the stated condition, banks’ choices in
equilibrium, subject to macroprudential regulation, lie within the set Qmicro0 . Hence, when
Qmacro0 is imposed on banks, there is no fire sale and no default, which is sufficient for
efficiency.
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APPENDIX B: INTERIOR SOLUTIONS
This appendix derives parametric restrictions under which the bank’s first-order conditions
(15) and (16) are necessary and sufficient for optimality. By the concavity of the bank’s
problem, this is the case as long as the choices they imply are feasible. The feasibility
conditions, implied by the budget constraint (3) and non-negativity of the bank’s choices,
are
0 ≤ n?0 + n¯?0 ≤
e0
h
0 ≤ n¯?0 ≤ n?0 + n¯?0

















The investment funded short-term debt satisfies n¯?0 ≥ 0 since r′ (0) = 0. Thus, to obtain





















1− p (1− h)− v1b
])
Since r and g are strictly convex, r′, g′ and their inverses are strictly increasing functions.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Farhi and Tirole (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2013) and Benigno et al. (2013) address the issue of ex
post policies such as bailouts, central bank loans and quantitative easing. Their analysis complements the
ex ante perspective of this paper.
2. If E [εzi ] = ε¯ 6= 0, one could simply redefine vˆ1s = v1s + ε¯ for all s, and εˆzi = εzi − ε¯ for all zi.
3. I assume away idiosyncratic risk at t = 2. This is for clarity of exposition and does not affect the
qualitative results.
4. Similar borrowing constraints can be derived as part of optimal contracts when there are inalienable
returns (Hart and Moore 1994) or moral hazard (Holmström and Tirole 1997).
5. This convention is for simplicity only. Using a different t = 0 market value does not change my qualitative
results, but introduces an additional constant into banks’ t = 0 budget constraint. However, the t = 1 budget
constraint and the analysis of fire sales would remain the same.
6. The assumption of fixed equity is fairly standard in the related literature, and represents a parsimonious
approach to modelling costs of or limits to outside equity issues, for instance due to informational asymmetries
(Myers and Majluf 1984). Additionally, I assume that no additional equity can be raised at t = 1. Relaxing
this would only affect my results if banks were able to raise outside equity in times of crisis, i.e. in the bad
state at t = 1. It is generally accepted that doing so is costly due to time pressure or debt overhang problems
(see Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 2011). In Section 5, I consider an extension with costly equity issuance at
t = 1.
7. The bank does not invest in unlevered projects that are funded in full by equity. It can be shown that
this assumption is without loss of generality, since the cash flow from an unlevered project can be replicated
by a combination of short-term debt and cash.
8. The assumption of convex disutility (e.g. Allen and Gale 2000) ensures that there is an interior solution
to the bank’s maximization problem, and a meaningful trade-off between investment in projects and holding
59
cash. There are other ways to achieve this, such as limited risk tolerance or decreasing monetary returns to
investment, but this formulation makes for a particularly neat exposition.
9. This indirect effect is closely linked to the point on maturity and systematic risk in Chen, Xu and Yang
(2013). In their dynamic model, firms with high systematic risk exposure choose a longer debt maturity.
Condition (15) shows that the optimal maturity of debt also lengthens with an increase in systematic risk
in my model.
10. I assume that the social planner always invests in some projects funded by short-term debt, or n0 > 0.
For n0 = 0, then there would be no projects for sale at t = 1 and the secondary market would shut down.
n0 = 0 would never be optimal since projects have positive NPV.
11.Other applications to finance include Kehoe and Levine (1993), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2003).
12. Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011) provide a general characterization of the (highly non-linear) marginal
value of firm liquidity in a dynamic model.




and Qmacro0 are technically efficient in this model, it is easy
to show that for any constraint Q′0 6= Qmacro0 , there exist values of the parameters other than v1b, v2b and h
such that Q′0 does not induce a constrained efficient equilibrium. In this sense, Qmacro0 is uniquely optimal.
14. These variables of course depend on the time-varying states, but I suppress the additional subscript to
save notation.
15.As in Lorenzoni (2008), a bound on the slope of D would be required to guarantee uniqueness of
equilibrium.
16. The source of this cost could be information asymmetries as in Myers and Majluf (1984), debt overhang
(Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 2011), or indeed any violation of the Modigliani-Miller conditions in times of
crisis. Acharya and Steffen (2012) provide evidence that investors required significant discounts on bank
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Figure 1: Welfare analysis
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